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Indefinite donkeys on islands ∗
Edgar Onea
University of Göttingen
Abstract In this paper I present a theory of indefinites which captures two of
their natural properties: indefinites license donkey anaphora (Geach 1962) and they
exhibit ‘specific’ readings in which they appear to scope out of scope islands. In
various flavours of dynamic semantics (Kamp 1981, Heim 1982, Dekker 2004),
these properties can be captured to the detriment of compositionally. Other theories
have employed more involved technical machinery like choice functions (Kratzer
1998, von Heusinger 2002), Hamblin-semantics (Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002) or
independence friendly logics (Brasoveanu & Farkas 2011) to derive exceptional
scope readings, but ignored donkey anaphora. Theories of E-type anaphora, on
the other hand, generally do not consider exceptional scope readings (Heim 1990,
Elbourne 2001). My own analysis combines insights from dynamic semantics
with referential indexing in LF-semantics, resulting in a fully compositional, static
system.
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1 Introduction
It is a well known fact that a) indefinites can scope out of islands and that b)
indefinites license donkey anaphora. a) is illustrated by the contrast in (1).1 One can
easily see that some, located in a scope island, allows two scope configurations which
every lacks. b) is illustrated by (2), in which the indefinite a donkey is surprisingly
translated as a universal quantifier instead of an existential quantifier in order to bind
the object-pronoun it. As opposed to this, a more natural translation as an existential
quantifier ends up having too narrow scope to bind the pronoun, as in (2b).
∗ This research has been supported by the German Initiative of Excellence funded by the German
Science Foundation at the University of Göttingen as part of the Courant Research Centre “Text
structures,” which I thankfully acknowledge. I am grateful to Regine Eckardt for helpful comments
on an earlier version of this paper. I would also like to thank the participants of SALT 23 for insightful
comments of my poster. All errors are my own.
1 In this paper I can only give a very cursory overview of the phenomena and the literature. An
extensive and comprehensive overview can be found in Bende-Farkas & Kamp 2001, Endriss 2009
and von Heusinger 2011.
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(1) a. Exactly five boys read most books that were recommended by some
professor.
f ive > most > some | f ive > some > most | some > f ive > most
b. Exactly five boys read most books that were recommended by every
professor.
f ive > most > every | ∗ f ive > every > most | ∗ every > f ive > most
(2) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
a. ∀xy.F(x)∧D(y)∧O(x,y)→ B(x,y)
b. ∀x.F(x)∧ (∃y.D(y)∧O(x,y))→ B(x,y)
The scope issue is most easily explained as follows: a scope island is a local
environment from which quantifiers cannot escape. Bona fide quantifiers (like most,
every or less than half ) never escape scope islands. The problem of indefinites is
that they can either out-scope islands or not. There seems to be a certain general
unwillingness to assume that scope islands simply do not care about indefinites. One
could, of course, postulate that indefinites can be interpreted in any environment,
which would trivialize the puzzle, as argued in Heim 2011, however, a more natural
explanation why they ignore islands seems preferable.
One way to put the the donkey problem is that in cases in which an indefinite is
interpreted in a local environment, it still may bind a pronoun outside that environ-
ment. However, as can be seen in (2a), if we were to assume that indefinites can be
universal quantifiers at times, the donkey readings would no longer be a problem,
since then, actually, the indefinite is interpreted higher, outside its local environment,
and can bind the desired pronouns without problems. But translating indefinites as
universal quantifiers seems to really be a desperate last resort decision.
If we were to assume that (2a) is the kind of representation semantic theory ought
to derive, this nurtures the impression that we can extract an indefinite from a scope
island either as an existential or as a universal quantifier: the ‘narrow’ scope reading
appears as a universal wide scope reading, as suggested in (3). And if this were
not enough of an embarrassment, it is obvious that there must be heavy and quite
opaque constraints on when an indefinite may become a universal quantifier and
when it may not. Heim (1982) discusses at length some proposals that capture the
respective properties of indefinites based on such conversions, e.g. those proposed
by Egli (1979), and shows a whole range of problems.
(3) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
a. wide scope: ∃y.D(y)∧∀x.F(x)∧O(x,y)→ B(x,y)
b. ‘narrow scope’ ∀y.D(y)→∀x.F(x)∧O(x,y)→ B(x,y)
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This kind of apparent quantificational variability motivated the claim in Kamp 1981
and Heim 1982 that indefinites are not actual quantifiers but variables/discourse
referents. Such variables get ultimately bound either by some existential or some
universal quantifier but, crucially, they do not introduce the quantifiers on their
own. The idea is sketched in (4). Notice that in (4) quantification goes over sets of
variables, and the variable of the indefinite may be captured or not by the universal
quantifier. Moreover, the widest scope existential quantifier is assumed to be a
default operator. However, also notice that it is crucial to have the restrictor D(y)
outside the island, or else a version of the famous Donald Duck problem arises
(Reinhart 1992), a reading made true by the existence of Donald Duck, mostly
assumed to be a non-donkey. Hence, while the donkey readings are fairly naturally
captured by the assumption that indefinites do not come with an own quantificational
force, their scope island ignoring properties do still seem to pose a problem.
(4) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
a. ‘wide scope’: ∃{y}.D(y)∧∀{x}.F(x)∧O(x,y)→ B(x,y)
b. ‘narrow scope’ ∃ /0.∀{x,y}.D(y)∧F(x)∧O(x,y)→ B(x,y)
c. Donald Duck reading: ∃{y}.∀{x}.D(y)∧F(x)∧O(x,y)→ B(x,y)
In this paper, I will elaborate on the idea that indefinites do not have a quantificational
force on their own. Instead, they act as variables which receive a default existential
closure. In this theory, however, indefinites are always fully interpreted in situ. As
a result of their interpretation, they impose a referential constraint on some local
referential environment. Crucially, however, referential constraints can but need not
be inherited to more global referential contexts in the process of composition. Ap-
parent wide scope then arises from an interaction between quantifiers and referential
contexts in their scope.
In a sense, the interpretation of indefinites that I propose is similar to the buoy-
ancy principle postulated in Geurts 2002 for DRT, according to which specific
indefinites tend to float towards more global DRSs, hence violating scope islands.
As opposed to Geurts’ system, however, in the present theory, indefinites do not ac-
tually violate scope islands and the computation is driven by simple lambda-calculus
(functional application and, for convenience, predicate modification). Moreover, the
theory that I propose is purely static and does not make any assumptions about the
role of context in the process of interpretation.2 Finally, since the syntactic tree fully
determines the outcome, the system is compositional in a particularly strong sense.
2 This is not to suggest that there is anything wrong with dynamic semantics. However, intuitively,
there is nothing in indefinites which requires a dynamic theory of meaning. Put differently, it is
reasonable to attempt to understand indefiniteness in a static framework regardless as to whether,
ultimately, a dynamic framework is chosen or not.
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It is not the case that there is no other, competing static and fully compositional
theory that is (at least in principle) able to handle the two phenomena we are inter-
ested in. For instance, Brasoveanu & Farkas 2011 propose an analysis of indefinites
that is similar in many ways, even though the underlying intuition is fundamentally
different. While for them indefinites are essentially existential quantifiers, and exis-
tential quantifiers have specific ways of scope-taking in the general framework of
independence friendly logic, in the theory proposed here, indefinites, just like other
referential expressions, do not have an intrinsic existential import.
In section 2, I introduce the main assumptions of the compositional system. In
section 3, I introduce quantification and indefinites. In sections 4 and 5, I show how
both donkey sentences and apparent scope island violation are handled in this theory.
I end with some general considerations about where the proposed theory should lead
to.
2 The basics
In this section, I introduce the basic compositional system and explain how it relates
to well known standard compositional systems. The aim of this section is to be able
to derive the truth conditions of some simple sentences such as those in (5).
(5) a. Peter loves Mary.
b. Peter loves himself.
It is fairly standard to consider an interpretation function for natural language which
is dependent on at least an assignment function and a world of evaluation, noted as∥∥ ∥∥w,g. It is also customary to assume that pronouns receive their referential value
from the assignment function, as in (6a), as argued in Heim & Kratzer 1998. For
instance Büring 2005 assumes that while proper names do not essentially depend on
assignment functions, they impose a constraint that the assignment function assigns
precisely their semantic value to their index, whence the representation in (6b).
(6) a.
∥∥hei∥∥w,g = gi
b.
∥∥Peteri∥∥w,g = P, defined iff gi = P
As a parameter of evaluation, we can think of the assignment function as a global
variable which stands for something I would like to call referential context. As with
the other parameters of evaluation, such as the world variable or a Kaplanian context
variable c, it is assumed that the rules of semantic composition do not generally
manipulate the assignment parameter. A well known exception are different versions
of predicate abstraction (Heim & Kratzer 1998). Similar exceptions are also known
for other parameters of evaluation: the world parameter is actively manipulated in the
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semantic composition by intensional expressions (von Fintel & Heim 2011) and the
context parameter in special ‘monstruous’ contexts (von Stechow & Zimmermann
2005).
In this paper, the main innovation that will lead to a natural solution of the indef-
inite problem is that referential contexts should not only be treated as a parameter
of evaluation in the semantic composition but rather as a local context that gets
incrementally specified in the process of computation. This has two aspects. The
first one is that we will get rid of the evaluation parameter g and instead assume
that the interpretation function will always output functions from assignments. The
second one is that semantic values of natural language expressions are specifically
interacting with referential contexts.
It is also possible to use a lambda notation for assignments without any sub-
stantive change. The rules in (7) and (8) will create isomorphic interpretations, as it
is easy to check, see also Poesio 1996. Thereby I use λα
[
condition
]
.β to write a
partial function from alphas that satisfy the condition to betas.3 Since A and B are
equivalent, one may generally prefer A as it leads to simpler expressions.
(7) Type A theories: g as a parameter of evaluation
a. Lexical entries A∥∥Peteri∥∥w,g = P iff gi = P ∥∥sleeps∥∥w,g = λxe.S(x)
b. Functional application A∥∥∥α β ∥∥∥w,g = ∥∥α∥∥w,g∥∥β∥∥w,g, iff ∥∥α∥∥w,g and ∥∥β∥∥w,g are defined
c. Predicate abstraction A∥∥∥∥α i β
∥∥∥∥w,g = ∥∥α∥∥w,gλxe.∥∥β∥∥w,gi/x
(8) Type B theories: g as part of semantic values
a. Lexical entries B∥∥Peteri∥∥w = λga [gi = P] .gi ∥∥sleeps∥∥w = λga.λxe.S (x)
b. Functional application B∥∥∥α β ∥∥∥w = λga [g ∈D ∥∥α∥∥w and g ∈D ∥∥α∥∥w] .(∥∥α∥∥w g)(∥∥β∥∥w g)
c. Predicate abstraction B∥∥∥∥α i β
∥∥∥∥w = λga.(∥∥α∥∥w g)(λxe.∥∥β∥∥w gi/x)
If we assume that semantic values of natural language expressions specifically
interact with referential contexts, we will need a different system. In particular,
we will use standard functional application, as in (7b), but we still use a special
3 The standard type system (e,s, t) is enriched by a, the type for assignments, which stands for functions
from numbers to individuals. Types are written in subscript.
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lambda notation for assignments in the lexical entries.4 Not all semantic values are
functions from assignments. While referential expressions are partial functions from
assignments, properties and transitive verbs are not. This is shown for a simple set
of examples in (9).
(9) Lexical entries C:
a. Proper Names:∥∥Peteri∥∥w = λga [gi = P] .gi
b. Pronouns and traces:∥∥hei∥∥w = λga.gi ∥∥ti∥∥w = λga.gi ∥∥himselfi∥∥w = λga.gi
c. Properties and transitive verbs:∥∥sleep∥∥w = λx〈a,e〉.λga [g ∈Dx] .S(xg,w)∥∥student∥∥w = λx〈a,e〉.λga [g ∈Dx] .S(xg,w)∥∥kiss∥∥w = λxy〈a,e〉.λga [g ∈Dx∧g ∈Dy] .K(yg,xg,w)
As in standard systems, referential expressions impose referential constraints on
referential contexts, but properties and transitive verbs are different in the sense that
they do not impose own constraints on referential contexts but provide a mechanism
of inheritance. So, while in B properties are totally neutral with regard to referential
contexts, in C properties have an inherited non-neutrality: they are designed as
devices of storing referential constraints. Put differently, the semantic composition
gathers all referential constraints encountered in a sentence as a definedness con-
dition on the output, which is a function from assignments to truth values. This is
exemplified in the example derivation below:5
(10)
∥∥∥∥∥Peter1 loves Mary2
∥∥∥∥∥
w
=
(∥∥loves∥∥w∥∥Mary2∥∥w)∥∥Peter1∥∥w =(
λxy〈a,e〉.λga
[
g∈Dx,y] .L(yg,xg,w) λha [h2=M] .h2)∥∥Peter1∥∥w =
λy〈a,e〉.λga
[
g2=M∧g∈Dy] .L(yg,g2,w) λha [h1=P] .h1 =
λga
[
g2=M∧g1=P] .L(g1,g2,w)
For the result in (9), truth can either be a result of applying some contextually salient
assignment, say g173, which satisfies the constraints. Or, there can be a more general
operator that turns functions from assignments into truth values. For explicitness,
I assume that the syntactic operator ASSERT, generally assumed to occupy ForceP
(Rizzi 1997), just like other speech act operators, has the function of matching
4 No predicate abstraction will be necessary.
5 The derivation does not proceed entirely step by step, but the omitted steps should be obvious enough
to reconstruct.
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referential restrictions on possible worlds and predications. The ASSERT operator
is given in (11). It is easy to see that, applied to (9), the result is the standardly
expected proposition given in (12):
(11)
∥∥∥ASSERT α ∥∥∥w = ∃g.g ∈D∥∥α∥∥w∧∥∥α∥∥w g
(12)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ASSERT Peter1 loves Mary2
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
w
=
= ∃g.g2 = M∧g1 = P∧L(g1,g2,w)  L(P,M,w)
The system is naturally suitable to handle pronominal binding, determined in the
syntax by co-indexing. This is exemplified in (13):
(13)
∥∥∥∥∥∥Peter1 loves himself1
∥∥∥∥∥∥
w
= λga
[
g1=P
]
.L(g1,g1,w)
Before concluding this section, a technical note is in order. While I will leave
this exercise implicit, when defining the metalanguage care must be taken of the
evaluation of logical connectives such that formulae intended to be true or false
do not come out as undefined. For instance, ∀g.g ∈ Dx→ xg could lead to the
evaluation of xg for g’s which are not in the domain of x. But of course this is not
intended: the formula should only evaluate xg for g’s which make the first part of
the implication true. This can, of course, be easily implemented.
What is the advantage of the compositional system sketched above as compared
to more standard ones? The main difference is that while in standard models
referential expressions only impose constraints on global assignments, in this model,
an assignment, as a referential context, is essentially local. The global effect arises
due to inheritance. Now, if we want to consider the ‘scope’ of indefinites, we will
need to impose a system of controls for inheritance. Put differently: an indefinite
will always impose a local referential constraint, however, there will be a mechanism
of control which may prevent referential constraints imposed by indefinites from
becoming global.
3 Indefinites and quantification
With the basic tenets of the theory developed in the previous section, we now discuss
the three components needed to see how indefinites behave in this system. First, I
show how indefinite NPs can be analysed. I then introduce relative clauses as an
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example of a scope island and finally, I introduce the universal quantifier.
3.1 Definites and indefinites
Following Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982), I assume that both indefinite and definite
DPs are non-quantificational. Instead, they impose a referential constraint. As
opposed to Heim and Kamp, however, I will opt for a uniqueness based theory of
definiteness, for practical reasons. Because my theory is static, familiarity is more
difficult to express. In this paper, I will not be concerned with an elaborate theory
of definiteness, hence, I will use a very simple Russelian (Russel 1905) theory of
uniqueness. In addition, I will assume later a rule of indexing which makes sure that
definite descriptions always get maximal scope, modulo the Binder Roof Constraint
(Brasoveanu & Farkas 2011).
With this background, the denotation of the indefinite article is given in (14). The
first argument is the standard denotation of an NP, i.e.,a property, a function from
the semantic value of some referential expression (type 〈a,e〉) to a function from
assignments to truth values. The most important part is the definedness condition
on the embedded function, i.e.,
[
P(λh.hi)g
]
. The first argument of P here is the
referential expression λh.hi which is simply the semantic value of a coindexed
pronoun.
(14)
∥∥somei∥∥w = λP〈〈a,e〉,〈a,t〉〉.λga.[g ∈D(P(λh.hi))∧P(λh.hi)g] .gi
It is easy to see that P(λh.hi)g is a stronger condition than g ∈ D(P(λh.hi)). In
fact, we only need the latter to make sure that in the evaluation of the formula no
unwanted breakdown arises due to undefinedness of some expression. For simplicity,
we therefore omit that condition, hence simplifying (14) to (15), keeping in mind
that the official version should remain (14):
(15)
∥∥somei∥∥w = λP〈〈a,e〉,〈a,t〉〉.λga.[P(λh.hi)g] .gi
An example for a simple sentence is given in (16). It is worth noting that in (16a) the
derivation of some1 man yields a function from assignments to individuals which is
only defined for assignment functions which assign to the referential index 1 a man.
(16)
∥∥Some1 man loves some2 woman∥∥w
a.
∥∥∥some1 man∥∥∥w = λga.[M(g1,w)] .g1
b.
∥∥∥∥some2 woman
∥∥∥∥w = λga.[W(g2,w)] .g2
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c.
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥some1 man loves some2 woman
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
w
=
λga
[
W(g2,w)∧M(g1,w)] .L(g1,g2,w)
Let us consider the denotation of the definite article. There is a slight technical diffi-
culty in spelling out the standard Russelian uniqueness condition, λP.λQ.∃x.Px∧(∀y.Py→ x = y)∧Qx, in the present system. The problem is that in (15) we have
applied the pronoun λh.hi to the property P, but as opposed to standard variables, the
uniqueness of pronouns would be an absurd requirement. This leads to a constraint
which is a bit longer and basically says the same. The official formula is given in
(17), but we will use a simplification given in (18):
(17)
∥∥thei∥∥w = λP.λga[ g∈D(P(λh.hi))∧P(λh.hi)g∧∀u.g[i/u]∈D(P(λh.hi))∧P(λh.hi)g[i/u]→u=gi
]
.gi
(18)
∥∥thei∥∥w = λP〈〈a,e〉,〈a,t〉〉.λga [P(λh.hi)g∧∀u.P(λh.hi)g[i/u]→u=gi] .gi
One of the reasons why the condition in (18) involves the modification of an as-
signment instead of simply a new universal quantification over assignments is that a
definite description may contain bound pronouns, as in (19). In such a case, a new
quantification over assignments would interrupt the respective dependencies, hence
imposing too strong conditions. For (19) that would incorrectly predict that every
person who has a mother has the same mother. Such a prediction is avoided by (18).
(19)
∥∥Some1 man loves (the)2 his1 mother ∥∥v
a.
∥∥∥∥∥the2 his1 mother
∥∥∥∥∥
v
=
λg
[
Mo(g2,g1,v)∧∀u.Mo(u,g1,v)→u=g2] .gi
b.
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
some1 man loves
the2
his1 mother
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
v
=
λg
[
M(g1,v)∧Mo(g2,g1,v)∧∀u.Mo(u,g1,v)→u=g2] .L(g1,g2,v)
It is worth noting that in the examples above we have only reproduced derivations
that can be done in the standard system as well, yielding exactly the same results.
It is only once we introduce relative clauses and quantification that the essential
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differences due to inheritance based composition become obvious.
3.2 Relative clauses
The syntax of relative clauses that I assume is simplistic but widely standard, as
shown in (20): the relative pronoun is co-indexed with a trace or pronoun.
(20)
who1
t1
loves Jane2
such that1
he1
loves Jane2
In a standard system of type A, a special rule is needed to create a property out of
the denotation of the clause: L(g1,J,w) λx.L(x,J,w). This is because, in order
to turn g1 into a variable, who would need to be able to directly manipulate the
global parameter of evaluation, which is not granted by functional application in the
A system. In a system of type B, as well, a special rule is necessary, even though
who would be able to manipulate an assignment directly. The problem is that the
rule of functional application in B lowers the type of the sister of who, hence in fact
sabotaging the (in principle) higher expressive power.
As opposed to this, in the system of type C proposed here, we have the higher
types of system B but also the harmless rule for functional application of system A.
This means that we need no special rule for relative pronouns, as we can create a
property out of a clause with a pronoun by a simple lexical entry, as shown in (21).
While this is not of particular relevance for the purposes of this paper, it is worth
noting that from the point of view of parsimony, this is an advantage of system C.
(21)
∥∥whoi∥∥w = ∥∥such thati∥∥w = λH〈a,t〉.λx.λg[g∈DH∧g∈Dx∧gi=xg] .Hg
In (21), the relative pronoun does not actually interfere with H itself. By opening a
slot for a referential expression, it only has to make sure that the newly to be intro-
duced referential constraint will be added to the ones priorly available. Moreover, it
will require that the new referential expression is evaluated to the same individual as
the index of the relative pronoun. This additional constraint could be omitted if we
would postulate that relative pronouns are co-indexed with the determiner of the NP
they are a part of. But it seems more straightforward not to request such an indexing
rule. The relative clause in (20) is computed in (22).
(22)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ who1 t1 loves Jane2
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
v
=λxg
[
g2=J∧g∈Dx∧g1=xg] .L(g1,g2,v)
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In order to be able to combine the arising property with a noun like man, we may
assume the predicate modification rule in (23),6 which yields the derivation in (24).
(23) Predicate modification C:
If the type of
∥∥α∥∥w = ∥∥β∥∥w = 〈〈a,e〉,〈a, t〉〉 then∥∥∥α β∥∥∥w = λx〈a,e〉.λga [g∈D∥∥α∥∥wx∧g∈D∥∥β∥∥wx] .∥∥α∥∥w xg∧∥∥β∥∥w xg
(24)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
man
who1
t1
loves Jane2
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
w
=
λx〈a,e〉.λga
[
g ∈Dx∧g2 = J∧g1=xg] .M(xg,w)∧L(g1,g2,w)
Notice that even though predicate modification is, as such, a symmetric rule, com-
bining a relative clause with a noun yields an asymmetric representation, i.e., the
referential constraints of the relative clause appear as inherited referential constraints
and the predications have different arguments: the predication introduced by man
has xg as referential argument, meanwhile loves has g1 as an argument. Since,
however, this is only defined for assignments such that xg= g1, ultimately, the result
will end up being symmetric. So, for instance:
(25)
∥∥ Some3 man who1 t1 loves Jane2 sleeps∥∥w =
λga
[
g2 = J∧g1=g3∧M(g3,w)∧L(g1,g2,w)] .S(g3,w)
3.3 Quantification
Up to now, we have discussed only two types of expressions: referential expressions,
which impose referential constraints, and properties (in the most general sense),
which inherit referential constraints to more global referential contexts. Quantifiers
are a different type of expression: they manipulate referential contexts directly,
hence, establishing three different referential contexts: their scope, their restrictor
and the output referential context, very similar to Kamp 1981, Heim 1982 and also
Farkas 1997, 2002. In order to be able to establish the relations between these
contexts, we will use some special indexing. First, I will introduce some notations
which will be used to model the permeability of referential contexts, then I introduce
the specific indexing used in quantification and finally, I give some lexical entries
and example derivations.
6 Of course, this rule is just for convenience. One can easily raise the type of relative clauses to combine
with nouns more directly.
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3.3.1 Permeability
We can define two notions to mediate between referential contexts:exceptive equality
and selective compatibility. The notion of exceptive equality is a more general notion
of equality. We say that h equals g except A, noted as h=Ag, as in (26), iff h and g
are identical except for the values assigned by indices in the set A. Thereby A is a
set of natural numbers. It is easy to show that = is the special case = /0.
(26) Exceptive equality:
h=Ag iff ∀i.i /∈ A→ hi = gi
The notion of selective compatibility is a more general version of compatibility.
h is in the domain of H, h ∈DH whenever there are no referential constraints on
H which rule out h. Crucially, we may be interested in such assignment functions
which would be in the domain of H if we were to disregard some of the referential
constraints. h∈ADH says that h is in the domain of H if we disregard those referential
constraints which concern the indices in A.7 It is easy to see that h ∈DH is the same
as h ∈ /0 DH.
(27) Selective compatibility:
h∈ADH iff ∃g.g=Ah∧g ∈DH
3.3.2 Indexing and syntax
Given that the current theory has higher typed-semantic values and that referential
contexts and inheritance are built into the semantics, the compositional system is
powerful, hence, there are various ways in which one can go about quantification. It
is possible to use in situ theories of quantification and it is possible to use quantifier-
movement-based theories. I will propose a version of quantification which assumes
that quantifiers always raise, that is to say, even in simple cases of subject quantifiers,
movement will be assumed. We will generally assume that the scope argument of
each bona fide quantifier is a proto-proposition, i.e.,it has type 〈a, t〉, and that the
quantifier will always have a trace within the scope. The restrictor of each quantifier
remains a property, i.e.,it has type 〈〈a,e〉,〈a, t〉〉, as shown in (28).
7 This particular formalisation of this notion tends to lead to non-emptiness entailments, i.e.,if we
disregard one referential constraint we implicitly assume that it could have been satisfied, but it is
not yet clear whether this is actually desirable. If this turns out to be a real problem, introducing the
individuals > and ⊥, such that > makes every formula true and ⊥ makes every formula false, helps
in avoiding unwanted entailments.
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(28)
Quantifieri Restrictor-Property〈〈a,e〉,〈a,t〉〉
Scope-Proto-Proposition〈a,t〉
... ti...
Given this skeleton, we may assume that quantifiers, have two additional index-
set arguments. The role of index set A is to specify those indices which impose
referential restrictions which should not be inherited from the restrictor to the global
context. The role of index set B is to specify those indices which impose referential
restrictions which should not be inherited from the scope to the global context. This
leads to the configuration in (29), but notice that any other configuration in which A
and B are visible to the quantifier determiner is acceptable.8
(29)
Quantifieri A
Restrictor
B
Scope
... ti...
Then at least the following indexing rules apply:
(30) Indexing Rules:
a. A and B never contain indices of proper names or quantifiers (other
than the active one).9
b. A and B may only contain indices of definite NPs if the quantifier
binds into their restrictor.
c. A and B never contain indices which do not appear in the restrictor
and scope respectively.
d. A may not contain i if i is the index of a pronoun in the restrictor which
is bound from outside the restrictor.
e. B may not contain i if i is the index of a pronoun in the scope which is
bound from outside the scope.
The use of these index sets is conceptually very similar to what happens in DRT or
FCS. If we consider standard DRT, A is the set of discourse referents declared in the
restrictor box and of B is the set of discourse referents declared in the scope box.
8 In Onea 2012 I propose a version with a more transparent syntactic structure concerning the index
sets, however, in that version, no donkey anaphora come for free.
9 We do not consider generic uses of proper names.
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3.3.3 Lexical entries and examples
The lexical entry for every, the only quantifier discussed in this paper, is very similar
to the treatment of quantifiers in various versions of dynamic semantics. In particular,
quantification goes over assignments. The main difference to the DRT treatment
of quantifiers is that in DRT, quantification extends embedding functions, however,
assignments in this theory are always total functions, hence they cannot be extended.
The notions of exceptive equality and selective compatibility are used instead.10
(31)
∥∥everyi∥∥w =
λA.λP〈〈a,e〉,〈a,t〉〉.λB.λH〈a,t〉.λha.
[
h ∈B\{i} DH∧h ∈A∪{i} D
(
P
(
λg.gi
))]
.
∀h′.h′ =A∪{i} h∧h′ ∈D
(
P
(
λg.g1
))∧P(λg.g1)h′→
∃h′′.h′ =B\{i} h′′∧h′′ ∈DH ∧Hh′′
Notice the special treatment of the i index. The formula can be significantly simpli-
fied if we assume that the quantifier index is always a part of the A index set and the
quantifier index is never part of the B index. The formulation in (31) tacitly repairs
wrong indexing, but if these indexing rules hold, we can simplify to (32). In the
following, we will make sure that the indexing allows the use of (32).
(32)
∥∥everyi∥∥w =
λA.λP〈〈a,e〉,〈a,t〉〉.λB.λH〈a,t〉.λha.
[
h∈BDH∧h∈AD
(
P
(
λg.gi
))]
.
∀h′.h′=Ah∧h′∈D
(
P
(
λg.gi
))∧P(λg.gi)h′→∃h′′.h′=Bh′′∧h′′∈DH∧Hh′′
We now can consider an example. For (33), the difference between narrow and wide
scope for the indefinite simply boils down to whether the referential index of the
indefinite appears in the B set or not.
(33) Every man loves some woman.
a. Narrow scope for some woman:
Every1 {1}
man
{2} t1
loves
some2 woman
b. Wide scope for some woman:
10 I do not give the types of A and B. We can either think of them as 〈a, t〉 or we can define an additional
type for sets.
506
Indefinite donkeys on islands
Every1 {1}
man
/0 t1
loves
some2 woman
For both readings, the scope argument is unchanged; its semantic value is given in
(34). Similarly, the restrictor is also the same, hence its semantic value is given in
(35):
(34)
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
t1
loves
some2 woman
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
w
= λh
[
W(h2,w)
]
.L(h1,h2,w)
(35)
∥∥∥∥∥ Every1 {1} man
∥∥∥∥∥
w
=
λB.λH.λh.
[
h∈BDH
]
.∀h′.h′={1}h∧M(h′1,w)→∃g.h′=Bg∧g∈DH ∧Hg
This leads to the readings in (36). In the calculation, I omitted the existential
quantification in the wide scope reading because it happens to be vacuous, as the
reader may check.
(36) a. Narrow scope reading:
λh.
[
h∈{2}{g|W(g2,w)}
]
.
∀h′.h′={1}h∧M(h′1,w)→∃h′′.h′={2}h′′∧W(h′′2,w)∧L(h′′1,h′′2,w)
b. Wide scope reading:
λh.
[
W(h2,w)
]
.∀h′.h′={1}h∧M(h′1,w)→W(h′2,w)∧L(h′1,h′2,w)
Notice that the second occurrence of the predicate W in the wide scope reading
is also vacuous, since h′ will already have inherited from h that h′2 is a woman.
Therefore we can delete the second copy.
Once we add ASSERT, the result for the wide reading is transparent, however the
narrow scope reading comes with a potentially surprising non-emptiness requirement
for the set of women. In (36a) the intuition is that the h∈{2}{g|W(g2)w} should
simply be disregarded, since it says that h is in the set of assignments which assign a
woman to 2 disregarding the requirement that h2 should be a woman. However, due
to the way =A has been formally implemented, ignoring this requirement would be
a computational error. As mentioned in footnote 7, this consequence can be avoided
using a more involved formal implementation, however, for now, it does not change
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the truth conditions and I therefore ignore it.
(37) a. Narrow scope reading with ASSERT:
∃h.∃g.W(g2,w)∧
∀h′.h′={1}h∧M(h′1,w)→∃h′′.h′={2}h′′∧W(h′′2,w)∧L(h′′1,h′′2,w)
b. Wide scope reading with ASSERT:
∃h.W(h2,w)∧∀h′.h′={1}h∧M(h′1,w)→ L(h′1,h′2,w)
This is the point at which the main advantage of the theory proposed here becomes
obvious. Treating referential contexts as local variables which are incrementally
enriched in the process of the computation allows us to fully compositionally derive
both narrow and wide scope for indefinites. Thereby, there is a very clear difference
between the way indefinites take ‘scope’ and the way quantifiers take scope. While
the scope of quantifiers is controlled by movement, the ‘scope’ of indefinites is
controlled by indexing alone.
One of the essential consequences of this decision is that in order for indefinites to
show ‘specific’ wide scope readings, they do not need to somehow be extracted from
a scope island. All the information needed at the higher level (i.e.,in establishing
the index set, which is outside the respective scope island) is the index of the
respective indefinite NP. Once the index is known, a decision can be made as to
whether the indefinite will have narrow or wide scope with respect to any quantifier.
It is important to see that this is conceptual progress, since knowing the index is
comparable to knowing the name of a variable, hence, the resources used to derive an
exceptional scope reading for indefinites are comparable to the resources used for the
reading (4c), however, this time, the Donald Duck problem no longer arises. Hence,
while the indexing used here is very similar to the sets of discourse referents used in
DRT, the basic semantics is fundamentally different, since in DRT, we need to have
both the name of the discourse referent and the condition reflecting the descriptive
material in the indefinite NP to take wide scope, whereas in this system the index
will suffice. This is shown on some examples in the next section.
4 Exceptional scope of indefinites
We now consider some examples of exceptional scope for indefinites. We will
thereby use a relative clause in the restrictor of every as a scope island. Since in
the present system the scope of indefinites is not established by movement, it is not
surprising that the two trees are directly interpreted as the wide and narrow scope
reading respectively.
(38) Every man who loves some woman sleeps.
a. Wide scope reading
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∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
Every1 {1} man
who1
t1
loves
some2 woman
/0
t1 sleeps
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
w
λh.
[
h ∈{1} {g|W(g2,w)}
]
.λv.
∀h′.h′ ={1} h∧W(h′2,w)∧M(h′1,w)∧L(h′1,h′2,w)→ S(h′1,w)
b. Narrow scope reading∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
Every1 {1,2} man
who1
t1
loves
some2 woman
/0
t1 sleeps
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
w
λh.
[
h ∈{1,2} {g|W(g2,w)}
]
.
∀h′.h′ ={1,2} h∧W(h′2,w)∧M(h′1,w)∧L(h′1,h′2,w)→ S(h′1,w)
If the indefinite is in the scope of a quantifier and not in the restrictor, precisely
the same will happen. This is only shown by the LFs. The computation should be
straightforward:
(39) Every man loves the picture some woman painted.
a. Wide scope reading: [[[[every1 {1}] man] /0] [t1 [loves [the2 [picture
[that2 [[some3 woman] [painted t2]]]]]]]]
b. Narrow scope reading: [[[[every1 {1}] man] {3}] [t1 [loves [the2
[picture [that2 [[some3 woman] [painted t2]]]]]]]]
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And, finally, so called intermediate readings are also possible, as suggested by the
structures in (40).
(40) Every boy believes that every man loves the picture some woman painted.
a. Wide scope reading for some woman:
[[[[every4 {4}] boy] /0] [t4 [believes [that [[[[every1 {1}] man] /0] [t1
[loves [the2 [picture [that2 [[some3 woman] [painted t2]]]]]]]]]]]]
b. Narrow scope reading for some woman:
[[[[every4 {4}] boy] /0] [t4 [believes [that [[[[every1 {1}] man] {3}]
[t1 [loves [the2 [picture [that2 [[some3 woman] [painted t2]]]]]]]]]]]]
c. Intermediate scope reading for some woman:
[[[[every4 {4}] boy] {3}] [t4 [believes [that [[[[every1 {1}] man] /0]
[t1 [loves [the2 [picture [that2 [[some3 woman] [painted t2]]]]]]]]]]]]
5 Donkey sentences
We now turn to donkey sentences, such as (41). This sentence has a natural wide
scope reading for some woman which allows the usual pronominal binding of her.
Crucially, however, even if some woman gets narrow scope, the pronominal binding
of her is possible. The reason for this is that the scope of a quantifier is evaluated in
referential contexts which may differ in any index which is relevant for the restrictor
from those assignment functions which verify the restrictor, as in DRT.
(41) Every man who loves some woman misses her.
a. Narrow scope
[[[Every1 {1,2}] [man [who1 [t1 [loves [some2 woman]]]]] /0] [t1
[misses her2]]].
λh.
[
h ∈{1,2} {g|W(g2)w}
]
.
∀h′.h′={1,2} h∧W(h′2)w∧M(h′1)w∧L(h′1)(h′2)w→miss(h′1)(h′2)w
b. Wide scope
[[[Every1 {1}] [man [who1 [t1 [loves [some2 woman]]]]] /0] [t1 [misses
her2]]] λh.
[
h ∈{1} {g|W(g2)w}
]
.
∀h′.h′ ={1} h∧M(h′1)w∧L(h′1)(h′2)w→miss(h′1)(h′2)w
6 Outlook
In this paper, I have proposed a theory of semantic composition for LFs which natu-
rally derives two properties of indefinites which have been puzzling in the literature:
that they license donkey anaphora and that they may scope out of scope islands.
To achieve this, I have used one of the main intuitions of dynamic semantics, that
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indefinites are not bona fide quantifiers. Instead, they introduce a discourse refer-
ent, which is modelled as a referential constraint. Crucially, referential constraints
introduced by indefinites (and any other referential expressions) are local (and not
global).
Of course, such a compositional system raises a number of questions. Most
prominently, there is a question as to whether the technical possibilities opened here
come with natural ways to capture constraints on the interpretation of indefinites.
We know from intensive research on indefinite determiners that various indefinite
determiners come with various types of constraints. For instance, Russian nibud
indefinites can only take scope under some quantifiers, especially under intensional
operators (Onea & Geist 2011). As opposed to this gewiss-indefinites in German, for
instance, generally take widest possible scope (Ebert, Ebert & Hinterwimmer 2012).
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